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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.
Case No. 20060911-CA
JOSE BALTARCAR ROYBAL,

:
District No. 051904214

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of DUI,
ii

a third degree felony. The Defendant was sentenced to formal probation for
thirty-six months.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-

3(2)(e)(2004).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
WAS DEFENDANT DETAINED FOR PURPOSES OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN THE OFFICER STOPPED
HIM AS HE WAS DRIVING HIS CAR?
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact should be analyzed
under a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions of

law should be reviewed under a correction of error standard of review. "In
reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress,
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.
However, in reviewing the court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of
error standard."

State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App.

1992)(citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Constitution of the United States
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Utah State Constitution
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
Utah Code Annotated
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003) - Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

?

(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol, a third degree felony. (R. 1). Defendant filed a motion
to suppress the evidence. (R. 23-24). A preliminary hearing was held on
November 10, 2005. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 18, 2006, in
front of the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin. (R. 38-39). The Court took the
i

matter under advisement. On April 20, 2006, the Court denied Defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 58-59). Despite the fact that the state was
ordered to prepare a findings of fact and conclusions of law, there were no
findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared.

On July 18, 2006, the

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty tp DUI, a third degree felony.
(R. 68-73). He was sentenced on October 5, 2006, to thirty-six months of
formal probation including a term of 180 days in jail.

(R. 85-87).

The

Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on October 11, 2006. (R. 8587). A timely notice of appeal was filed on October 23, 2006. (R. 90-91).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 18, 2006, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable
Parley R. Baldwin in response to the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
(R. 97). At that hearing Sergeant Ledford testified that he had received a call
from dispatch of "some sort of domestic dispute at 3865 Quincy, that there was
alcohol involved, that one party left the residence, that he was drinking and he
left in a van." (R. 97/2). Sgt. Ledford further testified that he had information
that the Defendant had driven away in the van and that he was intoxicated. (R.
97/4). Sgt. Ledford testified that he had received a dispatch code "1055 which
means an intoxicated driver" (R. 97/4).
Sgt. Ledford was driving to the scene when he came across a vehicle that
matched the description given by dispatch. (R. 97/5). He followed the vehicle
for over a block and finally initiated his emergency lights and detained the
Defendant. (R. 97/6). In his testimony at the preliminary hearing Sgt. Ledford
testified that the Defendant was driving approximately 20 to 25 miles an hour
on Patterson (speed limit 35 mph) and continued on Harrison Boulevard in
approximately 20 to 25 mph (speed limit 40 mph).

(R. 95/3).

Sergeant

Ledford observed no weaving of the vehicle, no illegal turns or other traffic
violations. (R. 95/12). In his testimony at the evidentiary hearing Sgt. Ledford
changed his testimony to say that the Defendant was driving at "no more than 5

4

miles an hour.'5 (R. 97/7). He also testified that he was aware that there had not
been a physical fight at the residence according to the dispatch tape. (R. 97/15).
Sergeant Ledford also testified that the primary reason for pulling over
the Defendant's vehicle was the report from dispatch. (R. 97/18).
On April 20, 2006, the trial court issued a ruling denying the
Defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court listened to the tape of the 911
call. (See Addendum B). The trial court was troubled that the dispatcher had
told the officer that the Defendant was highly intoxicated. The trial court ruled
that the use of the term "highly" was a mischaracterization. The trial court,
however, found that the giving of the 1055 code was reasonable when taking
into account the 911 call received. The trial court further found that upon
receiving the information that the Defendant was highly intoxicated and
driving, required Sergeant Ledford to seize the defendant independent of any
driving pattern. The trial court further found that the defendant did not exhibit
any driving pattern that violated the law. (R. 95/23-25).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The officer testified, and the court found, that based solely upon a 911
call in which the dispatcher mischaracterized the level of the Defendant's
intoxication, resulted in a situation where the arresting officer had reasonable

suspicion to activate his overhead flashing lights and pull over the Defendant.
Once the officer takes that step, the encounter would clearly escalate to a level
two encounter, requiring reasonable suspicion.

The 911 dispatcher is an

employee of the police department and, as such, acts as a governmental agent.
When the dispatch officer improperly characterized and enhanced information
received from a citizen with unknown reliability, that mischaracterization does
not establish reasonable suspicion allowing an officer to seize a defendant.
The officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed
any type of crime; and, therefore, according to established case law the stop
was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Any evidence obtained after that a legal stop constitutes fruit of the
poisonous tree and should be excluded from evidence.

ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well
as Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, provides in
relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated."

In the case of State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 10, 999 P.2d 7, the Court
held:
A car stop and investigatory detention by police of the
car's occupants constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276
(Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah
Ct.App.1992). To surmount the Fourth Amendment's
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, a limited
crime investigation stop must satisfy a two-part test: " 'First, the
officer's initial stop must be justified; second, subsequent actions
must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying the
stop.' " Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234 (quoting Case, 884 P.2d at
1276); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879,
20L.Ed.2d889(1968).

In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah App. 1994) this Court was
presented with a factual situation remarkably similar to the case at bar. In that
case an officer activated his overhead lights seizing a defendant's car based
solely on a dispatch allegation that a crime had occurred. The court reversed
the trial courts denial of a motion to suppress based on the grounds that there
was never a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. In that case this Court
stated,
Merely providing descriptive information to an officer about
whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there
are no articulable facts pointed to which establish why a stop
was to be made.
Furthermore this Court held:

n

[T]he legality of a stop based on information imparted by another
will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to
the individual originating the information or bulletin
subsequently received and acted upon by the investigating
officer. ( State v. Case 884 P.2d 1274, * 1277-1278 (Utah
App.,1994))

The official record is devoid of any written findings of fact and
conclusions of law. However, the trial court made oral findings at the
conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress. The Court found that the
dispatcher told the officer that the defendant was highly intoxicated. The court
found that the term "highly" was a mischaracterization but that the dispatcher
was nonetheless reasonable in giving the 1055 code. The court further found
that the dispatcher had reasonable suspicion that justified the report to the
officer to enable the initial detention as follows:
• The dispatcher, after listening to the 911 caller, could conclude that she
was intoxicated.
• The 911 caller told the dispatcher that she and the defendant had been
drinking. (R. 95/23-24)
At the time of the stop Sergeant Ledford relied solely on the information
gleaned from a short dispatch conversation and did not observe any traffic
violations that would rise to the level of reasonable suspicion or add to the
totality of circumstances.

8

Judge Baldwin incorrectly ruled that Sergeant Ledford had reasonable
suspicion to seize the Defendant. This ruling was in error due to the fact that
the dispatcher could not have established reasonable suspicion based upon the
negligible information received from the 911 caller. An analysis of Utah State
Appellate Court decisions involving what constitutes reasonable suspicion
would clearly indicate that the information relied on by the dispatcher does not
meet the threshold requirement of reasonable suspicion.
In the case of State v. Valdez 68 P.3d 1052, 1059 (Utah App. Ct. 2003),
the Court was presented with a case where the police officers were executing
an arrest warrant on an individual. That individual requested that the officers
allow her to go into her bedroom to put on some weather appropriate clothing.
The officers accompanied the individual into her bedroom, at which point they
discovered a male individual (the defendant) lying on the bed with his hands
obscured from the officers view. The officers, in an attempt to insure their
safety, woke the individual, discovered that he had nothing in his hand, and yet
proceeded to request his identification.

The defendant originally told the

officers that he did not have any identification, and then, when asked,
proceeded to give the officers a false name. Upon discovering that the false
name and been given, the officers arrested the defendant; and in a search
incident to arrest, discovered methamphetamine. The trial court suppressed all

the evidence, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that suppression with a
holding as follows:
The trial court found, and we are not presented with a factual basis
to disturb its finding, that nothing supported the officers'
investigation into Valdez's identity during the detention. The trial
court further found that no articulable facts existed to support a
reasonable suspicion that Valdez was involved in any criminal
activity. Therefore, Robinson's request for Valdez's identification,
or, absent that, information concerning his identity, exceeded the
scope of the reason justifying the initial detention and unnecessarily
expanded its duration and scope. Thus, we conclude that the trial
court correctly suppressed any evidence gathered from that point
forward. (Id, at 1059)
In the case of State v. Lafond, 68 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Utah App. 2003), the
Court reaffirmed its longstanding position that mere nervous behavior does not
constitute "reasonable suspicion" required for a Level-two detention. In that
case the court held:
We have previously held that because nervous behavior, such as
"avoidance of eye contact, is consistent with innocent as well as
criminal behavior," such conduct "can be afforded no weight in
determining a detaining officer's reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity." State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). We are likewise reluctant to assign any
particular importance to nervous conduct when determining
reasonable suspicion in the context of a Terry frisk for weapons,
at least, as in this case, when the nervousness is unaccompanied
by any hostile, threatening, or aggressive behavior. Although
"an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out
of the car pending completion of the stop, "Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408, 415 117 S.Ct 882, 886 (1997) it is not difficult to
understand why such an experience would make a person
nervous.
10

Nervous behavior would be analogous to the limited information the
dispatcher had in the present case. The dispatcher must understand that when
the 911 call is made regarding a domestic dispute the caller generally
overstates rather than understates the situation. In this case the dispatcher
knew that the caller and the Defendant had been in a verbal disagreement;
however, it was made adequately clear that no assaultive behavior had
occurred. The caller stated that she had been drinking; however, she gave
absolutely no information as to how much the Defendant had been drinking.
The relevant portions of the transcript of the 911 call are as follows:
DISPATCHER: Okay, what's the problem. Tell me exactly what's happening.
MS. MCCAINE: The person that's been living with me is an asshole and I
want him the fuck out of here.
DISPATCHER: Okay, someone has been living with you and they're being have they assaulted you?
MS. MCCAINE: Just about, yes....
DISPATCHER: Does he have any weapon?
MS. MCCAINE: No.
DISPATCHER: And he hasn't assaulted you?
MS. MCCAINE: No.

DISPATCHER: Has he been drinking?
MS. MCCAINE: Yes.
DISPATCHER: He has been drinking?
MS. MCCAINE: We both have. We both have. And you might have to take
both of I don't even give a shit, I just want him out.... (R. 096/1-2, spelling
and grammar original)
The fact that the officer that pulled the defendant over after having
followed the defendant for a considerable period of time without observing any
traffic violation should have eliminated rather than bolstered any possible
suspicion that the defendant was driving in an intoxicated state.
In a similar case, State v. Yazzie, 2005 UT App. 261, ^8, 116 P.3d 969
this Court reversed a conviction of a defendant based on a fourth amendment
violation where the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a stop.
In that case the officer knew the defendant and observed him driving. The
facts that the officer believed established reasonable suspicion are as follows:
[The officer] pulled behind Yazzie's (the defendant's) car and
followed him for about four blocks, during which time he noted
that Yazzie committed no moving violations. He then executed a
traffic stop. To justify his decision to detain Yazzie, [the officer]
testified that he made the stop because he was convinced that
Yazzie did not have a driver license. He based his conclusion on
his previous encounters with Yazzie—which he estimated
amounted to ten or more—as well as Yazzie's contact with other
officers of the BPD. [The officer] testified that the BPD had
encountered Yazzie "well over a hundred" times in the
10

preceding twenty years, mainly for crimes that involved alcohol,
and Yazzie had never produced a driver license on any of these
occasions; not with Halliday, and not with any other officer of
the BPD. (FN2). In fact, [the officer] testified that he "would
have bet anything that [Yazzie] had no driver's license."
In a case with a factual situation almost identical to the case at bar, the
New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction due to a Fourth
Amendment violation. In State v. Burciaga , 866 P.2d 1200, 1201 (N.M.App.,
1993), the Court described the facts as follows:
Las Cruces Police Officers Thomas and Montoya were
dispatched to the Burciaga family home in response to a call
concerning a domestic dispute. The dispatch did not indicate that
any crime had been committed or was being committed, nor did
the dispatch indicate who was involved in the alleged dispute. On
the way to the Burciaga residence, Officer Montoya noticed a
truck on the road that he knew belonged to Defendant. Officer
Montoya also knew that Defendant was associated with the
Burciaga residence. It is not clear from the record whether
Defendant lived at the house or was only related to the residents.
The officer did not witness Defendant driving recklessly or
suspect that he was driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. He simply notified central dispatch that he
was going to stop Defendant to see if everything was "okay,"
while Officer Thomas continued to the Burciaga residence.
The Court reversed the defendant's conviction based upon a Fourth
Amendment violation with facts nearly identical to those in the case at hand.
Although Defendant recognizes that in the present case there was an additional
mention that the Defendant had drank an unknown amount of alcohol, there

was the additional factor that the 911 call indicated that there had been no
domestic violence.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court
find that the trial court erred in ruling that the stop of the Defendant was a level
one encounter. Since the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to activate
his overhead lights and institute a level two encounter, the Defendant's
constitutional rights were violated and the exclusionary rule requires the
evidence be suppressed. The Defendant therefore requests this Court reverse
the trial court and remand for a suppression of the^evidence.
DATED this

2/

day of March 2007.

RANDALL Wr RICHARDS
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, yfaT^4114-0180/posfyge prepaid
this ^ day of March 2007.
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Attorney at Law
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEM
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APR SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

V£

Case No: 051904214 FS

JOSE BALTARCAR ROYBAL,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PARLEY R. BALDWIN
October 5, 2006

PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: PARMLEY, RICHARD A
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney (s): GALE, GARY L
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 8, 1945
Video
Tape Number:
BIO0 506
Tape Count: 9:57
CHARGES
1.

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - 3 r d D e g r e e
Plea: Guilty
- D i s p o s i t i o n : 07/19/2006 G u i l t y

Felony

HEARING

This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present and is
represented by Gary Gale, private counsel. Court proceeds with
sentencing.
Mr. Gale files a notice of appeal and motion to stay the
proceedings. Court denies the motion to stay and imposes
sentencing.

Sentence, J u d g m e n t & Commitment

l!tUIIIIBIi!£liS(llIIEifilli'll!

051904214

Page 1

JD19259957
R O Y B A L r J O S E BALTARCAR

Case No: 051904214
Date:
Oct 05, 2006
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER TRIE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 18 0 day(s)
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$2775 . 00
$0 . 00
$1285,30
$2775.00
$2775.00
$0
$1285.30
$2775.00
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 18 0 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 2775.00 which includes the surcharge,
Interest may increase the final amount due.

Page 2

Case No: 052 904214
Date:
Oct 05, 2006
PROBATION CONDITIONS
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State
Department: of Adult: Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its
terms and conditions.
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to
the court whenever required.
The defendant shall violate no lav;, either federal, state or
municipal.
The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse
evaluation and any treatment deemed necessary, paying all costs, as
directed by Adult Probation & Parole.
The defendant shall not consume alcohol or illegal drugs.
Tne defendant shall submit to random search, seizure, and chemical
testing.
The defendant shall maintain full-time, verifiable employment.
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult
Probation and Parole, and pay all costs.
The defendant shall have installed an Ignition Interlock Device on
any vehicle owned or operated by defendant, and shall maintain the
same for a period of three years, paying all costs.
The defendant shall abide by a 7:00 p.m. curfew for the first 9 0
days after release from jail.
The defendant shall serve 18 0 days in the Weber County Jail to
report on 10/6/06 © 3 : 0 0 a.m.
The defendant may r>e released to the Kiesel facility for
employment.
The defendant shall pay $2,775 fine through Adult Probation &
Parole.
The defendant is advised this is a zero tolerance probation.
The ignition interlock is to remain until 10/05/2009
Dated this

1 j day of

VJAJ^

,

20

'AO
OA

PARKEY R. BALDWIN
District Court Judge

Page 3 (last)

ADDENDUM B
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 051904214 FS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JOSE ROYBAL,
Judge Parley R. Baldwin

Defendant.

911 DISPATCH TAPE AUGUST 8, 2005

CAROLYN ERJCKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092 '
801-523-1186

c

'

L^rt^

l

1 I

DISPATCH TAPE 8-28-05

2

D I S P A T C H E R : 9 1 1 . What is the address o f your e m e r g e n c y ?

3

M S . M C C A I N E : 65 Quincy A v e n u e , get over here quick.

4

DISPATCHER:

5

M S . MCCAINE:

6

D I S P A T C H E R : T h e phone number you're c a l l i n g

7

M S . MCCAINE: My phone.

8

DISPATCHER:

9

M S . MCCAINE: 392-9498.

10

DISPATCHER:

What's t h e phone you're c a l l i n g from?
Huh?
from?

Okay, w h a t ' s the p h o n e n u m b e r ?

Okay, w h a t ' s the p r o b l e m .

Tell m e e x a c t l y

11 j w h a t ' s h a p p e n i n g .
12
13
14
15

M S . MCCAINE:

T h e p e r s o n that's b e e n l i v i n g with m e is an

asshole a n d I w a n t h i m t h e fuck out of h e r e .
DISPATCHER:

Okay, someone h a s b e e n l i v i n g with y o u a n d

they're b e i n g - h a v e they assaulted you?

16

M S . MCCAINE:

Just a b o u t , y e s .

17

D I S P A T C H E R : W h o is this p e r s o n to you?

18

M S . MCCAINE:

19

D I S P A T C H E R : Okay.

20

M S . MCCAINE: Annalee McCaine.

21

DISPATCHER:

22

MS. MCCAINE: Annalee, A-n-n-a-1-e-e.

23

D I S P A T C H E R : Okay, is he still t h e r e ?

24

M S . MCCAINE: Yes.

25

DISPATCHER:

Significant other.
A n d w h a t ' s your n a m e ?

Emily?

Does h e h a v e any w e a p o n ?

MS. MCCAINE: No.
2 |

DISPATCHER: And he hasn't assaulted you?

3 !

MS. MCCAINE: No.

•

DISPATCHER: Has he been drinking?
5 1

MS. MCCAINE: Yes.

6

DISPATCHER: He has been drinking?

7 J

MS. MCCAINE: We both have.

We both have.

And you might

have to take both of. I don't even give a shit, I just want him
9
10

out.
DISPATCHER: Okay, Annalee, just calm down for me, take a

11

couple of deep breaths.

12

And this is a roommate?

I'm going to get somebody out there.

13

MS. MCCAINE: Yes.

14

DISPATCHER: Okay, what's his name?

15

MS. MCCAINE: Jose.

16

DISPATCHER: Jose?

17

MS. MCCAINE: He's out putting stuff in his van.

18

DISPATCHER: Is he leaving?

19

MS. MCCAINE: Yes.

20 I

DISPATCHER: What's his last name?

21 I

MS. MCCAINE: He's going to be gone before you get here.

22 j

DISPATCHER: Well, I've got the call in, okay?

Where is he at right now?

And I can't

23 J - I'm getting some information to the officers. I've got the
24

call in, okay?

So you talking to me isn't going to hinder in

25

them responding, okay?

What's Jose's last name?
MS. MCCAINE: Roybal.
DISPATCHER: How do you spell that?
MS. MCCAINE: R-o-y-b-a-1.
DISPATCHER: How old is he?
MS. MCCAINE:

Sixty he'll be.

Fifty-nine.

DISPATCHER: Is he white, black or Hispanic?
MS. MCCAINE: Hispanic.
DISPATCHER: Okay, what kind of vehicle does he drive?
MS. MCCAINE: A van.
DISPATCHER-. What kind of ^an.
MS. MCCAINE: - white van, 1985.
DISPATCHER: Do you have a plate number on the vehicle?
MS. MCCAINE: 8 85 something.
DISPATCHER: Is he still in the driveway?
MS. MCCAINE: No, he's pulling out right now.
DISPATCHER: Okay, where is he heading?
MS. MCCAINE: I have no idea.

He's heading south.

DISPATCHER: South on what street?
MS. MCCAINE: Quincy, 38th and Quincy, 38 - my house.
DISPATCHER: So he's leaving on Quincy Avenue?
MS. MCCAINE: Yes.
DISPATCHER: And it was a white van. Do you know the make
of it?
MS. MCCAINE: GMC.
3

1

DISPATCHER: And the partial plate was 855?

2 I

MS. MCCAINE: 8 83.

3 J

DISPATCHER: How long ago did he leave?

4 |

MS. MCCAINE: About 30 seconds.

5

DISPATCHER:

6 |

MS. MCCAINE: Yes, he has been.

7 i

DISPATCHER: Okay, I'm going to have an officer get out

And this is the person that lives with you?

8 I there as soon as I can, okay?
9

a call and let us know, okay, if he returns.

10

MS. MCCAINE: Thank you.

11 |

DISPATCHER:

12 J

If he responds back, you give us

Okay, bye-bye.

(End of CD recording!
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1

CERTIFICATE

2

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript

3 I of the 911 dispatch CD provided by Mr. Gary L. Gale was
transcribed by me from a CD recording and is a full, true, a
5 I correct transcription of the proceedings as set forth m

the

6 J preceding pages to the best of my ability.
Signed this 14*"1" day of February, 2006 m

7 |

Sandy,

Utah.
9
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10
11 (
12

Carolyn Erickson, CSR
My Commissions expires May 4, 2006
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